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I. INTRODUCTION
Warren Buffett, investment magnate and Chief Executive Officer of
Berkshire Hathaway, wrote an editorial in the New York Times saying
political contributions, as investments, were far undervalued.1 Buffett
wrote that a campaign finance contribution could buy a great deal of
political influence: "As a fund-raising senator once jokingly said to me,
'Warren, contribute ten million dollars and you can get the colors of the
American flag changed. '"'2
For almost a century, Congress enacted campaign finance legislation
in an effort to eradicate the perceived corruption flowing from large
campaign contributions. 3 Its most recent attempt was the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA"), 4 which addressed two major
sources of contention in campaign funding: (1) the ease with which
candidates could circumvent spending limits through soft money
donations and (2) the prevalence of televised issue advertisements
purchased with soft money, and the misleading effects of these
advertisements on the voting public.5
Immediately after the BCRA became law, its constitutionality was
challenged in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,6 in which the
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1. Warren E. Buffett, Op-Ed., The Billionaire's Buyout Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2000, at D14.
2. Id.
3. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 115 (2003).
4. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 28, 36, and 47 U.S.C.).
5. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 129-30, 132.
6. Id. at 132.
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Supreme Court of the United States upheld all of the Act's major
provisions.7 This Article will examine four main empirical claims the
Court makes in McConnell: (1) wealthy campaign donors are able to buy
greater access to politicians with campaign contributions, (2) limits on
freedom to associate within party committees are necessary in order to
prevent campaign finance abuses, (3) reductions in campaign funding will
not inhibit political campaigns, and (4) those who purchase campaign
advertisements must be identified so voters are not misled by the
advertisements' messages. The first two claims are diagnostic; they
identify problems with the pre-BCRA political system. The final two
claims are predictive; they examine the BCRA's potential to reform
campaign finance. Analyzing these four claims will provide insight into
the Court's beliefs about money's corruptive effect on politics and the
BCRA's role in remedying that corruption.
In its analysis of the BCRA, the Supreme Court shifts between two
definitions of corruption.8 The first definition describes a system in
which donors can purchase political influence by making large campaign
contributions. 9  However, the second turns on little more than the
appearance of impropriety: It describes a campaign finance system in
which large contributions merely facilitate access to public officials. 10
While this allows wealthy donors unequal access to representatives, some
say it results in no unfair influence over the legislative process. While
it presents many examples of the second definition of corruption, the
Court is unable to provide hard evidence that donors were able to
purchase political influence with campaign contributions before Congress
enacted the BCRA.1 2
The Court is able to capture both types of corruption, however, by
stating that it wants to eradicate both "corruption and the appearance of
corruption" in politics. 1 3 While granting donors unequal access does not
necessarily influence politicians' legislative decisions, it gives rise to the
appearance that they are being swayed by contributors. Further, the
research presented indicates that it is nearly impossible to separate
access from influence.
The pre-BCRA campaign finance laws could not address the many
7. Id. at 132-33.
8. See id. at 143.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 119.
11. See id. at 119 n.5 ("[T]he average American has no significant role in the political process.").
12. Cf id. at 150-51,155-56.
13. Id. at 142.
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instances where access led to influence because they permitted campaign
spending practices that resulted in the appearance of corruption. 14
Statements from congressmen and lobbyists, as well as reports from
independent research groups, raise a strong inference that the pre-BCRA
system of campaign finance regulation did not sufficiently curb
corruption.15 Thus, the broad definition of corruption in McConnell was
the Court's only means of curbing both actual and perceived corruption.
By aiming to eradicate corruption and the appearance of corruption,
which are both sufficient to indicate the presence of campaign spending
abuses, Congress took an important step in changing the way campaigns
are conducted.
II. BACKGROUND
A.The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
The BCRA is composed of amendments to the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA"), 16 the Communication Act of 1934,17
and other portions of the United States Code. 18 It is the most recent
attempt by Congress "to purge national politics of what was conceived
to be the pernicious influence of 'big money' in campaign
contributions." 19
Modern campaign finance reform became a national priority when
Congress passed the FECA 20 in 1972 in an effort to limit the effect of
big contributors on politicians. 21 In order to increase public awareness of
the individuals and corporations donating significant funds to campaigns,
the FECA required greater disclosure of campaign contributions and
prohibited contributions made in another person's name. 22 To limit the
amount of money businesses could give to candidates, the FECA also
prohibited corporations and unions from using general treasury funds for
14. See infra Part II (providing history of campaign spending before the enactment of the BCRA).
15. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 183.
16. 2 U.S.C. § 431-442 (Supp. V 2007).
17. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (Supp. V 2007).
18. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 114.
19. United States v. Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 572 (1957).
20. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
21. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 114.
22. See Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972). Under this Act, disclosure was required of all
contributions exceeding $100 and all expenditures by candidates and political committees whose
spending exceeded $1,000 per year. Id.
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political contributions and expenditures. 23
Under the FECA, businesses were required to donate through
segregated funds known as political action committees ("PACs"), which
had specific disclosure requirements. 24
Just two years later, Congress amended the FECA in order to close
loopholes candidates used to exceed the FECA's spending limits. 25 The
1974 amendments prevented the formation of unlimited political
committees for fundraising purposes, which allowed candidates to
circumvent limits on individual committees' receipts and
disbursements. 26 The 1974 amendments also introduced contribution
limits that allowed individuals to donate up to one thousand dollars to a
single candidate, but no more than twenty-five thousand dollars in an
election cycle. 27 Finally, the 1974 amendments imposed ceilings on
how much candidates could spend on national conventions, required
reporting and disclosure of contributions exceeding certain limits, and
established the Federal Election Commission ("FEC") to enforce the
FECA and future campaign finance legislation. 28
B.Buckley v. Valeo's Challenge to the FECA
The amendments to the FECA were challenged in the 1974 case
Buckley v. Valeo.29 In its decision, the Court struck down limits on
individual expenditures, which were used to fund political
communication.30  Additionally, the Court upheld limits on
contributions to national party committees, or hard money
contributions, in an effort to reduce the effects of large contributions on
federal campaigns.31 Donors easily circumvented these restrictions after
Buckley, however, by making large soft money contributions to state
and local political parties, which were then used to influence federal
23. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 118.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 118-19.
26. See id. at ll8.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 118-19.
29. 424 U.S. 1, 5 (1976).
30. See id. This communication is comprised largely of televised campaign advertisements. See id. at
19.
31. See id. at 28-29.
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elections.3 2
Individuals and corporations who had reached the permissible limits
on hard money donations were permitted to donate unlimited amounts
of soft money to state and local parties, which were "unaffected by [the]
FECA's requirements and prohibitions. '33 The FEC allowed political
parties to fund "mixed purpose activities[,] including get-out-the-vote
drives and generic party advertising," partly with soft money.
34
C.Post-Buckley Campaign Spending Abuses and the BCRA
The Buckley decision created a soft money loophole that allowed
contributors to fund limitless issue advertisements, so long as they did
not expressly advocate for or against a certain candidate. 35 To help
political parties distinguish between issue advertisements and express
advertisements, the FEC devised a bright-line test that, in the view of
many critics, opened the floodgates for abuse.36  It held that
advertisements using the words "vote for," "vote against," or "elect"
constituted express advocacy and could only be funded with hard
money. 37 All other electioneering communications could be funded with
soft money. 38  With such a narrow definition of express advocacy,
political parties easily circumvented the hard money restrictions and
funded much of their campaign advertising with soft money. 39
In 1998, the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs issued a
report on campaign finance abuses after investigating spending in the
1996 election. 40  The Committee concluded that "the 'soft money
loophole' had led to a 'meltdown' of the campaign finance system that
had been intended 'to keep corporate, union, and large individual
32. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 122.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 123 (citing FEC Advisory Op. 1978-19; FEC Advisory Op. 1979-17).
35. See id. at 126.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 126-27. "Little difference existed, for example, between an ad that urged viewers to
,vote against Jane Doe' and one that condemned Jane Doe's record on a particular issue before
exhorting viewers to 'call Jane Doe and tell her what you think."' Id.
40. Id. at 129 (referencing S. REP. No. 105-167 (1998)).
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contributions from influencing the electoral process.' ' 41 After Buckley,
the Committee found that big donors had contributed exponentially
more soft money as the FEC permitted more liberal use of funds.42
When the BCRA was passed in 2002 in an effort to remedy campaign
finance abuses, it was no surprise that the crux of the bill focused on soft
money and the issue advertisements funded by soft money.
The BCRA prohibited national parties, their committees, and their
agents from raising, spending, receiving, or directing any soft money, 43
and it imposed greater restrictions on campaign advertisements,
including disclosure and reporting requirements for electioneering
communications. 44 These restrictions were intended to "'shed the light
of publicity' on campaign financing" and help voters make better-
informed decisions. 45
Immediately after the BCRA was enacted, the Act was challenged for
potential infringements on constitutional rights, including freedom of
speech and association, in McConnell.46 The plaintiffs claimed that the
restrictions imposed by the BCRA violated their rights to freedom of
speech and association. 47 The Court, however, held that the BCRA's
restrictions on soft money donations and issue advertisements were
justified in order to prevent "actual and apparent corruption of federal
candidates and officeholders. '48 The following analysis will explore the
Court's claims in McConnell in an effort to determine the extent to
which large campaign contributions have a corrupting effect on politics.
41. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 105-167 (1998)).
42. Id. at 124. "Of the two major parties' total spending, soft money accounted for 5% ($21.6 million)
in 1984, 11% ($45 million) in 1988, 16% ($80 million) in 1992, 30% ($272 million) in 1996, and 42%
($498 million) in 2000."
43. See 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a) (2006).
44. See id. at 224-25.
45. See id. at 231 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 81 (1976)).
46. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 140 n.42.
47. See id. at 159.
48. Id. at 143.
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III. ANALYSIS
A.Does Money Have a Corrupting Influence on Politics?
1.Large Campaign Contributions May Allow Donors to Buy Legislative
Influence
The major assumption underlying the McConnell decision is that
money has a corrupting effect on politics and, by regulating campaign
spending, Congress can halt corruption and the appearance of corruption
in election cycles.
The Court found that, by upholding the provisions of the BCRA, it
was bolstering Congress's "fully legitimate interest in maintaining the
integrity of federal officeholders and preventing corruption of [the]
federal electoral processes. '49
In McConnell, the Court operates under the belief that the "political
potentialities of wealth" have "untoward consequences on the
democratic process. '50  The Court quotes former Senator John
Bankhead, who asserted that "money is the chief source of corruption"
in politics, and that large contributions can create obligations between
political parties and donors.5 1
Candidates must raise a significant amount of money to run a
campaign with any hope of success.52  The New York City Bar
Association, in its report on campaign finance reform, stated:
Money buys all the things crucial for a modern election campaign-
broadcast and radio air time; the printing and mailing of campaign
literature; transportation costs; the services of campaign professionals
for crafting the campaign message, conducting polls, and producing
campaign advertisements; the salaries of campaign workers; the rent for
campaign offices; the costs of data-processing equipment and computer
time; even the expenses incurred in raising the funds necessary to pay
49. Id. at 187.
50. United States v. Auto. Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1957).
51. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 116-17 n.2 (quoting 86 CONG. REC. 2720 (1940)).
52. See ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN. REFORM, DOLLARS AND
DEMOCRACY: A BLUEPRINT FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 84 (2000), available at
http://www.abcny.org/Publications/reports/show html.php?id=44 (last visited Nov. 9, 2008)
[hereinafter CITY OF N.Y. BAR, DOLLARS].
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for the other campaign expenditures. These services are unlikely to be
provided by volunteers. They require money.53
Given the crucial role money plays in running a successful campaign,
there are major incentives for politicians to raise as much as possible and
by any means necessary.5 4  This is particularly true for first-time
candidates, or those challenging incumbents whose names are already
familiar to the voting public.55 Without money, these candidates would
have no hope of election.5 6
However, the dissent in McConnell stated that quid pro quo political
relationships, including the relationship between contributors and the
politicians they support, did not necessarily raise an inference of
corruption.57  Congressmen are constantly making quid pro quo
agreements with their colleagues by promising to support legislation in
exchange for support of their own pet projects.58 Justice Kennedy said
that voters also exercise quid pro quo influence over candidates: "It is
well understood that a substantial and legitimate reason, if not the only
reason, to cast a vote for, or to make a contribution to, one candidate
over another is that the candidate will respond by producing those
political outcomes the supporter favors. Democracy is premised on
responsiveness. ' 59  However, the majority's holding is based on the
premise that there is an important difference between the support that
one buys with a vote and the support that one buys with a large
campaign contribution. 60
The obvious difference between a quid pro quo vote and a quid pro quo
campaign contribution is that all eligible Americans can vote, while not
all Americans can make significant campaign contributions. Moreover,
while both voters and donors can express dissatisfaction with a candidate
by withdrawing their support-either ideologically or monetarily-there
is overwhelming evidence that politicians are more responsive to
requests from donors than they are from voters. 61  Former Senator
Barry Goldwater 62 once said, "As far as the public is concerned, it is the
53. Id.
54. See id. at 91.
55. Id.
56. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 185 (2003).
57. See id. at 297 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 144 (majority opinion).
62. Senator Goldwater, a Republican, represented Arizona in the United States Senate.
MCCONNELL V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
PACs and the special interests they represent, and not the people, who
set the country's political agenda and control a candidate's position on
the important issues. '63
The Court noted that some campaign contributors often give money
to both parties' candidates, so they have a supporter in Congress
regardless of who wins the election. 64 This example of so-called bet-
hedging shows that many corporate and individual donors are more
interested in buying friends-and influence-than supporting candidates
with a shared ideology.
While buying friends in politics is not inherently corrupt, the Court is
concerned that donors who give to both parties' candidates are merely
trying to buy legislative support, no matter who wins the election. 65
The value of these "friendships" cannot be underestimated. The
major donor programs at the Republican National Committee ("RNC")
promise contributors special access to high-ranking party officials,
including elected representatives. 66 These programs, called "Team 100"
and the "Republican Eagles," require large, sustained donations from
participants. 67 During the 1996 election cycle, Team 100 asked for an
initial contribution of one hundred thousand dollars, and then twenty-
five thousand dollars per year for the next three years. 68 Republican
Eagles paid fifteen thousand dollars in annual contributions. 69 While the
donation schedule was aggressive, the RNC delivered on its promise.
The Committee's chairman escorted a donor personally to meetings,
which "'turned out to be very significant in legislation affecting public
utility holding companies' and made the donor 'a hero in his
63. 132 CONG. REc. S990 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1986) (statement of Sen. Goldwater).
64. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 124-25. The Court states:
Moreover, the largest corporate donors often made substantial contributions to both
parties. Such practices corroborate evidence indicating that many corporate
contributions were motivated by a desire for access to candidates and a fear of being
placed at a disadvantage in the legislative process relative to other contributors, rather
than by ideological support for the candidates and parties.
Id.
65. See id. at 125.
66. Id. at 130.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 130 n.30.
69. Id.
20081
10 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. 12:1
industry."' 70 In this instance, sustained donations guaranteed a donor
access to political officeholders and influence over legislation.
Anecdotal evidence that money can buy both friendship and legislative
support provides perhaps the strongest support for the BCRA's
campaign spending limits.
2.While Arguably Necessary, Individual Spending Limits Affect
Ideological Donors' Ability to Contribute to Campaigns in Ways
They Find Meaningful
Some studies indicate that not all campaign contributors are trying to
buy influence. 71 The New York City Bar Association's Commission on
Campaign Finance Reform, after studying corruption in campaign
contributions, concluded that ideological donations-or donations from
contributors who say they are not interested in buying influence or
legislative support-are not intended to corrupt and do not have a
corrupting influence on politicians. 72
The report found that limiting these donors' contributions simply
deprives them of the opportunity to express their ideological support
through donations. 73
The Court, however, has held that limitations on ideological
contributions do not appreciably restrict donors' freedom of
expression. 74  In Buckley the Court held, "The quantity of
communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with
the size of the contribution, since the expression rests solely on the
undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. ' 75 The Court found that
contribution size is a "rough index of the intensity of the contributor's
support for the candidate," and that limiting monetary contributions
does nothing to discourage contributors from discussing political issues
and candidates with friends, coworkers, and so forth. 76
70. Id. at 130-31 (quoting S. REP. NO. 105-167 (1998)).
71. CITY OF N.Y. BAR, DOLLARS, supra note 52, at 93.
72. Id. The New York City Bar Association defined a corrupt contribution as one given with the
intent to influence legislation. Id.
73. See id. at220-21.
74. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 135 (2003) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976)
(per curiam)).
75. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
76. Id. The Court notes:
A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign organization thus
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The Court's holding on this issue could be influenced by the small
number of campaign donors considered true ideological contributors. An
independent research study indicated that only 4.7 percent of donations
to the Republican and Democratic parties in the 2006 election cycle
were given by ideological donors, whereas 75.1 percent of contributions
were given by businesses that were not considered ideological donors.77
It appeared that most ideological support took place outside of the
realm of campaign contributions, and that caps on individual donations
have a relatively small effect on ideological expression. 78
In its holding on individual contribution limits, the Court left
ideological donors little choice in how they can express their support for
favored candidates. The Court's rationale in Buckley, and echoed in
McConnell, is that ideological supporters can back candidates without
using money, for instance, by volunteering at a campaign headquarters
or displaying political signs in their yards. 79  But because money is
crucial to running a successful political campaign, it is easy to see why
supporters believe a large monetary donation is worth more than a few
days of volunteering.80 The research presented in this section indicates
that some, if not the majority, of campaign contributors donate with the
intent of influencing legislation. Considering the Court's dual definitions
of corruption, however, these donations should not be limited unless
they result in undue access to, or influence over, politicians. Thus, it is
necessary to further study the empirical claims in the McConnell
decision in order to determine if the regulations imposed by the BCRA
are justified.
involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of
support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to
discuss candidates and issues.
Id.
77. Congressional Races: The Big Picture, http://opensecrets.org/overview (follow "2006 elections"
hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 21, 2006).
78. This is especially true when considering that just one-fourth of one percent of the American
population donates to campaigns and that those donors mostly represent a rich minority of Americans.
See Bailey, Do Campaign Contributions Lead to Policies that Favor the Wealthy? An Examination of
Taxing and Spending in the American States 16 (Mar. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author); see also Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and
Participation, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 73, 85 (2004).
79. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at21.
80. CITY OF N.Y. BAR, DOLLARS, supra note 52, at 84.
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B. Claim I: Wealthy Campaign Contributors Can Buy Access to Elected
Officials Thus, They Have Opportunities to Influence Legislation
That Most Citizens Cannot Afford.
Former Senator Goldwater once wrote:
To be successful, representative government assumes that elections will be
controlled by the citizenry at large, not by those who give the most money.
Electors must believe their vote counts. Elected officials must owe their
allegiance to the people, not to their own wealth or to the wealth of interest
groups who speak only for the selfish fringes of the whole community.
81
The McConnell decision is based on the claim that, without spending
limits, politicians are tempted to legislate on behalf of the moneyed few
who make large donations to the detriment of constituents who cannot
express their support through visible contributions.8 2 In McConnell, the
Court stated that big businesses and unions are able to buy greater access
or special favors from candidates.83 If this is the case, the wealthy
minority donating to campaigns do more than help candidates
disseminate their political platforms.8 4 If it is possible to buy influence,
then wealthy individuals can have significant influence over legislation
once a favored candidate lands in office, simply by making a large
campaign contribution.
1. Does a Wealth Bias Exist in Politics?
Some scholars argue that corruption is rampant, and that "elected
representatives are so indebted to the special-interest donors on whom
they depend for their political existence that they are losing their ability
to provide their best judgment in representing the citizens who elected
them. ' '85 During the 1996 election cycle, for instance, the RNC used a
formal incentive structure for major donors and offered incrementally
greater access to elected officials based on contribution size. 86  In
McConnell, the Court tried to prevent Congressmen from allowing
contributors to set their legislative agendas.87
81. Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring the
Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLuM. L. REv. 1126, 1127 (1994).
82. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 175 (2003).
83. See id.
84. CITY OF N.Y. BAR, DOLLARS, supra note 52, at 89.
85. Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 81, at 1126-27.
86. Id.
87. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 151. These legislators were "pressed by their benefactors to introduce
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Often, campaign contributors are subtle in the way they assert their
influence. The New York City Bar Association found that large
contributors rarely engage in "outright vote buying." 88 Instead of quid
pro quo, dollars-for-votes influence, campaign contributions often allow
a donor
an extra opportunity to make one's case, to be heard during
negotiations while a bill is in committee, to influence a member of
Congress to make one bill rather than another an agenda priority, or to
affect the precise wording of a bill or amendment. Without changing
votes, campaign contributions can affect what bills become law.89
Considering the legislative benefits that campaign contributions can
secure, some corporations consider such donations a cost of doing
business. 90  This creates an atmosphere where political contributions
become another opportunity for businessmen to one-up competitors,
which can be easily exploited by politicians who influence legislation or
regulatory activities that affect businesses. Some businessmen fear that
they will lose their competitive edge to more generous donors and give
more money to maintain their position. 91
Some studies, however, indicate that money does not necessarily
purchase increased influence. 92 Professor Michael Bailey of Georgetown
University found that political contributions have little to no effect on
election outcomes. 93 Studies analyzing the effects of contributions on
roll-call voting indicate that campaign contributions do not affect how
Congressmen vote on major issues, although they may affect voting on
minor issues. 94 Although Bailey cites studies showing the ineffectiveness
of campaign contributions in assuring increased influence, he
acknowledges the inconsistency between those results and donor actions,
asking, "If money has no effect, why is so much contributed?" 95 The
perceived effects of money in politics may have created a political
climate where wealthy donors would rather hedge their bets with a large
legislation, to amend legislation, to block legislation, and to vote on legislation in a certain way." Id.
88. CITY OF N.Y. BAR, DOLLARS, supra note 52, at 92-93.
89. Id.
90. See DAVID ADAMANY & GEORGE E. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY: A STRATEGY FOR CAMPAIGN
FINANCING IN AMERICA 11 (1975).
91. Id.
92. Bailey, supra note 78, at 5.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 15-16.
95. Id. at 5.
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donation than forego an opportunity to influence legislation.
In a country where people are increasingly disillusioned with the
government and unsure that their needs are being represented, the Court
is right to be concerned with the appearance of corruption in the
political process. 96  Before the BCRA, scholars claimed that "[t]he
current campaign finance system lies at the heart of the public's
disillusionment. '97 Americans are aware of the huge financial burdens
placed on political candidates, and many people who cannot donate
believe they have no real opportunity to influence the political
process. 9
Statistics show that most donors do not represent the voice of the
majority of constituents. Wealthy campaign contributors compose the
vast majority of donors, although they are a small minority of the
population. During the 1996 election, individual contributions were
donated by one-fourth of one percent of the population.9 9 These
donors are ninety-nine percent white, seventy-six percent male, and
forty percent are older than sixty-one years of age. 100 In a year when
the median household income was around thirty five thousand dollars,
seventy-eight percent of campaign contributors earned more than one
hundred thousand dollars per year, and thirty-eight percent earned more
than two hundred fifty thousand dollars per year. 10 1 Additionally, the
majority of financial contributions come from businesses. For example,
in the 2004 election cycle, businesses donated seventy-four percent of
all campaign contributions.10 2 Thus, if campaign contributions do, in
fact, influence legislators, then the interests being represented are those
of a small, rich minority.
2. Campaign Contributions Influence Congressmen's Political Decision-
Making
The assertion that wealthy individual and business donors give money
to influence legislation is backed by anecdotal evidence from donors
themselves. Robert Rozen, a partner at Ernst & Young, candidly stated
96. Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 81, at 1130.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 1130-31.
99. Bailey, supra note 78, at 3 (referencing DAVID DONNELLY, JANICE FINE & ELLEN S. MILLER, ARE
ELECTIONS FOR SALE? 7 (2001)).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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the extent to which campaign donations induce a sense of obligation in
politicians:
You are doing a favor for somebody by making a large soft money
donation and they appreciate it. Ordinarily, people feel inclined to
reciprocate favors. Do a bigger favor for someone-that is, write a
larger check-and they feel even more compelled to reciprocate ....
[P]eople do have understandings.103
Referring to campaign contributions as favors to be repaid ignores the
essential difference between politics and private industry, where such
behavior is both permitted and encouraged. Public officials are charged
with representing their constituents, not building stronger relationships
with donors. However, campaign contributions push donors' pet
projects into the spotlight. As former Senator Dale Bumpers 104 said,
"Every Senator knows I speak the truth when I say bill after bill after
bill has been defeated in this body because of campaign money. 10 5
Former Senator Paul Douglas 06 discussed the problems that arise
under a system where political contributions are funded by large, visible
donations from wealthy contributors. The greatest risk, according to
Senator Douglas, is that politicians' loyalties will subtly shift from their
communities to their campaign contributors.107  This is possibly the
strongest support for the BCRA's strict limits on donations. If
politicians are unable to perceive when they are being manipulated, even
the most pragmatic representative could be subconsciously supporting
legislation that helps big donors. Limiting campaign contributions would
get politicians back on track and allow them to focus on the people who
voted them into office-not only those who helped finance their
campaigns. Thus, the BCRA addresses the major shortcomings in the
current system of campaign finance in two ways: First, by implementing
spending limits to prevent donors from making large, visible
contributions and conditioning elected representatives-knowingly or
unknowingly-to prioritize the needs of contributors over those of
constituents, and second, by helping restore public confidence in the
government by scaling back the appearance of corruption in political
103. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 147 (2003).
104. Senator Bumpers, a Democrat, represented Arkansas in the United States Senate.
105. 139 CONG. REc. S7180 (daily ed. June 15, 1993) (statement of Sen. Bumpers).
106. Senator Douglas, a Democrat, represented Illinois in the United States Senate.
107. Wertheimer & Manes, supra note 81, at 1129 (citing PAUL H. DOUGLAS, ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT
44 (1952)). "Throughout this whole process the official will claim--and may indeed believe-that
there is no causal connection between the favors he has received and the decisions which he makes."
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fundraising, and by showing Congress's commitment to remedying
campaign finance abuses.
C. Claim II: The BCRA's Limits on Freedom to Associate are Necessary
to Prevent Campaign Spending Abuses
In order to close the soft money loophole, the BCRA prohibited
parties from transferring soft money from state and local committees to
federal committees.108 In the years before the BCRA, state and local
parties often fielded large soft money contributions on behalf of federal
candidates and used those funds to campaign for that candidate. 109
Abuses of the system before the BCRA were rampant; Senator Wayne
Allard ° wrote a contributor in 1996 to say that the contributor had
reached "the limit of what you can directly donate to my campaign, but
you can further help my campaign by assisting the Colorado Republican
Party." 11 Former Senator Warren Rudman1 2 said that, unless state and
local parties were prevented from using soft money donations to
campaign for federal officials, the system of beholdenness to large soft
money contributors will remain. 3
The BCRA's Levin Amendment11 4 provided a limited exception to
the Act's soft money ban by allowing state and local parties limited use
of soft money contributions to fund generic party advertising and voting
activities. 5  These activities included voter registration and get-out-
the-vote campaigns, which had to be funded through a combination of
Levin funds and hard money.116 Because of the emphasis on generic
party activities, Levin funds could not be used for any campaign
activities referring to a clearly identified candidate for federal office, and
they could only be used to fund broadcast communications if the ads
108. 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)(1) (Supp. V 2007).
109. McConnell v. FEC, 504 U.S. 93,164-65 (2003).
110. Senator Allard, a Republican, was elected to the United States Senate in 1996. Before his term in
the Senate, Senator Allard served Colorado in the House of Representatives.
111. FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 458 (2001). This letter was an
attempt to subvert the limits on how much a single donor could contribute to a single candidate by
funneling money to the candidate's state political party. See id. The money donated to the state would
later be used to help Allard's campaign. Cf id.
112. Former Senator Rudman, a Republican, was elected in New Hampshire to the United States
Senate.
113. McConnell, 504 U.S. at 164 n.59.
114. 2 U.S.C. § 441(i).
115. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 353 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
116. See id.
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referred to a candidate for state or local office.117 Corporations and
unions were permitted to donate Levin funds to political parties;
however, donations were capped at ten thousand dollars per source.118
Election activities paid for with these donations had to be funded partly
with Levin monies, and parties had to use hard money to make up the
difference in budget. 119
In addition to the cap of ten thousand dollars per contributor, Levin
funds were subject to a number of restrictions that fueled the plaintiffs'
challenge in McConnell. Federal officeholders; national party
committees; and officers, employees, and agents of national party
committees could not raise Levin funds.120 State parties could not raise
Levin funds for other state parties-either directly or through joint
fundraising-and state parties could not transfer Levin funds to other
state parties.1 21 Lastly, national parties could not transfer hard money
to state and local parties to make up for deficiencies in Levin funds. 122
The Court's justification for upholding the Levin Amendment was
that it prevented big donors from giving multiple ten thousand dollar
donations to a number of state and local committees, which could later
be transferred to their committee of choice.1 23  Without the Levin
Amendment's restrictions, the Court feared that "[d]onors could make
large, visible contributions at fundraisers, which would provide ready
means for corrupting federal officeholders."1 24  The amendment,
however, drew criticism on the grounds that it infringed on parties'
freedom to associate because it prevented them from sharing funds with
other state party offices.1 25 But by upholding the Levin Amendment
restrictions, the McConnell Court seemed to ignore the underlying
reasons for allowing state and local parties to raise Levin funds at all.
Since the BCRA almost completely curtailed political parties' ability
to raise and spend soft money, allowing Levin funds at all was a
noteworthy concession. However, the restrictions on transferring Levin
funds between party committees and federal, state, or local parties reach
117. 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).
118. See id.
119. Robert Bauer, McConnell, Parties, and the Decline of the Right ofAssociation, 3 ELEC. L.J. 199,
202 (2004).
120. See 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(2)(B)(iv).
121. Id. § 441i(b)(2)(C).
122. Id.
123. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 171-72 (2003).
124. Id. at 172. In this sense, corrupting means buying access to federal officeholders.
125. See id.
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further than necessary to prevent abuse. Because the amendment
included strict rules about what Levin monies can fund, local and state
parties were simply prohibited from saturating the airwaves with issue
advertisements that directly addressed specific federal candidates, like
those circulated after Buckley.126 In practice, however, the BCRA's
limits on raising and transferring Levin funds essentially cut against
parties' ability to fund their most important activities: get-out-the-vote
campaigns and voter registration drives.
Generic voter activity is essential to a political party's sustainability
and, unlike issue advertisements, the aim of these activities is not to
discredit the opposing party. Because parties had come to rely on soft
money for these activities, the restrictions in the Levin Amendment
struck a severe blow.127 However, the Court justified its decision by
finding that the Levin Amendment restricted financial contributions
instead of political activities and that those restrictions were a modest
infringement on associational rights.128
By upholding the restrictions on fundraising and transferring money
between state and federal parties, the Court's holding in McConnell also
signaled a change in the permissible limits on the freedom to
associate. 129  Before Buckley, the Court held that the freedom of
association was an "inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due
Process Clause" and that the strictest level of scrutiny applied when
association was limited. 130 In McConnell, however, the Court held that
minor restrictions on parties' freedom to associate were permissible. 131
This is a significant shift from counting associational rights among the
fundamental liberties guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. 132
The Court's answer to the plaintiffs' concerns about the associational
burdens imposed by the Levin Amendment is based on little more than
prejudicial predictions about electioneering activities. 133 The Court held
that the "evidence regarding the impact of [the] BCRA on [parties']
126. See id. at 202.
127. See id. at 200 ("So however much the rise of soft money might be lamented, there could be no
question that this form of financing had become important to parties, and not only for the financing of
the infamous issue ads. Other core party-type activities-such as voter registration and get-out-the-
vote activities-were significantly limited."). For parties who were "operating within the confines of
the law as then interpreted and enforced," a major source of funding dried up overnight. Id.
128. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 172.
129. See id. at 199.
130. NAACP v. Ala. ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (citations omitted).
131. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 171 (2003).
132. See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460.
133. Bauer, supra note 119, at 202.
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revenues [was] 'speculative and not based on any analysis.' ' 134 While
that may be true, the Court could have just as easily found that the
plaintiffs were speculating correctly and associational barriers would
prove difficult to overcome. Instead, it assumed that allowing more
association between state and local parties would invite corruption and
denied the claim. 135
The Court noted that state and local parties could avoid Levin
Amendment restrictions by paying "for federal election activities
entirely with hard money. ' 136 However, the Court assumed that state
and local parties could fundamentally change the way they raise and
allocate their funds at a moment's notice. This holding "advanced the
notion that an associational burden is not unconstitutional, so long as
there is an alternative means, however much more circuitous or costly,
to engage in the same activities."' 137
In McConnell, the Court upheld the Levin Amendment without fully
exploring the associational burdens that the restrictions contained in the
amendment would place on state and local parties. The Court assumed
that state and local parties would have no problem using "homegrown"
hard money for Levin activities, without any chance to supplement
their generic campaign activities with funds from other committees or
federal party offices. 138
Nevertheless, when viewed in light of the BCRA's overarching goal of
eradicating corruption in campaign finance, the restrictions imposed by
the Levin Amendment appear necessary to curb the abuse of soft money
transfers between state and national party offices that were used to
circumvent contribution limitations. To soften the blow on freedom to
associate, the Court left its holding on the Levin Amendment open to
"as-applied challenges." 139 Therefore, this holding allowed the Court to
curb a major source of campaign corruption while protecting political
parties' cherished constitutional rights.
134. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 173 (citations omitted).
135. See Bauer, supra note 119, at 203. "There was no way for the Congress or the Court to know
that corruption would pursue this route, but if Congress is given leeway for predictions, little
justification for the anti-circumvention measure-little, that is, beyond speculation-is required." Id.
136. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 171.
137. Bauer, supra note 119, at 202.
138. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 173.
139. Id. at 173.
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D. Claim III: All Political Parties Will Be Able to Effectively Advocate
with Reduced Campaign Funding
While McConnell restricted the flow of soft money to political
parties, the Court expressed no concern that the decision would unduly
limit parties' ability to disseminate campaign messages. The Court
credited political parties as being "extraordinarily flexible in adapting to
new restrictions on their fundraising abilities. ' 140 The Court also found
that the pertinent question in evaluating campaign finance reform is not
how much money political parties have at their disposal during
campaigns. Instead, it said that campaign finance reform becomes
problematic if it is so severe that it drives the voice of the recipient
below the level of notice.1 41
Since Congress passed the FECA, the Supreme Court has disagreed
about the role money should play in campaigns. In his concurring
opinion in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government Political Action
Committee,1 42 a 2000 case upholding campaign finance limits, Justice
Stevens argued that popular candidates would fare as well without large
campaign contributions.1 43 He said some candidates try to buy with
money what great leaders inspire with words alone.1 44
Stevens's view is in direct opposition to the holding in Buckley, where
the Court found that "virtually every means of communicating ideas in
today's mass society requires the expenditure of money." 145 From the
Court's many examples of the ways political parties use campaign
donations to fund electioneering communications and voter education
activities, there is no indication that restricting money will do anything
but restrict parties' ability to reach the public.1 46
140. Id.
141. Id. (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 397 (2000)).
142. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
143. See Shrink Mo., 528 U.S. at 398 (Stevens, J., concurring).
144. Id. He notes:
Speech has the power to inspire volunteers to perform a multitude of tasks on a
campaign trail, on a battleground, or even on a football field. Money, meanwhile, has
the power to pay hired laborers to perform the same tasks. It does not follow, however,
the that the First Amendment provides the same measure of protection to the use of
money to accomplish such goals as it provides to the use of ideas to achieve the same
results.
Id.
145. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
146. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 162 (2003).
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Limiting soft money donations disproportionately impacts minor
parties, which are not eligible for the same amount of public funding as
major party candidates. Adding barriers to the fundraising abilities of
parties like the Green Party or Independent Party further limits their
ability to succeed in elections. Spending limits prohibit these parties
from concentrating their resources, creating roadblocks to ballot access
and recognition as an established political party. 147 For instance, the
BCRA restrictions on the transfer of soft money between state and local
party committees will prevent minor party candidates from amassing
their contributions and spending them in a key state or district. The
challenges posed by the BCRA only add to the difficulties minor party
candidates face in securing adequate campaign financing. 148
Eligible minor party candidates may run their campaigns with the help
of public funding, a system first administered by the FEC in 1976.149
After the FEC determines a candidate's eligibility, the Commission
decides how much public money that candidate is entitled to receive. 150
As a rule, candidates from minor parties are not eligible to receive the
same amount of public campaign funding as the two major parties
because they are unable to command the necessary number of popular
votes.151 While the government support initially helps launch some
minor party candidates' campaigns, they need significant additional
funding in order to be election contenders. The Court has stated in past
opinions, however, that allowing them to do so would "not only make it
easy to raid the United States Treasury, it would also artificially foster
the proliferation of splinter parties. 152
Theresa Amato, Ralph Nader's campaign manager in the 2000
presidential election, described the challenges of running a minor party
campaign, noting that Nader was dismissed by major news outlets and
147. D. Bruce La Pierre, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Political Parties, and the First
Amendment: Lessons From Missouri, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1101, 1117-18 (2002).
148. See Richard Briffault, Reforming Campaign Finance Reform: A Review of Voting with Dollars, 91
CAL. L. REV. 643, 670-71 (2003); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 98.
149. Federal Election Commission, Public Funding of Presidential Campaigns,
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/pubfund.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
150. Id. For primary elections, candidates are entitled to receive matching funds from the
government, for up to two hundred and fifty dollars of an individual's total contributions to an eligible
candidate. Id. Funds are also available for candidates to pay off campaign debts, even if the
candidate is no longer actively campaigning. Id. In general elections, "[a]lthough minor and new
party candidates may supplement public funds with private contributions and may exempt some
fundraising costs from their expenditure limit, they are otherwise subject to the same spending limit
and other requirements that apply to major party candidates." Id.
151. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 98 (1976).
152. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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unable to afford expensive television advertisements in prime time
slots.153 Nader, an extremely popular minor party candidate, was able to
creatively use the Internet to drum up support and organize so-called
superallies.154 However, his success in reaching voters is the exception
rather than the rule for minor party candidates. 55
While it is clear that soft money limitations fall hardest on minor
party candidates, one of the BCRA's aims is to prevent the
disproportionate impact on these candidates. Congress has no obligation
to assist minor party candidates at the expense of campaign finance
reform, and while it remains to be seen whether the BCRA will
discourage minor party candidates from running for office, the overall
positive effects of the BCRA easily outweigh the concerns about driving
minor party candidates' voices below the level of notice.1 56
E. Claim IV: The Individuals and Interests Groups Who Fund
Electioneering Communications Must Be Identified, Lest They
Misrepresent Their True Interests to the Voting Public
In McConnell, the Court stressed that the people and interest groups
behind electioneering communications must be identified in order for the
public to make informed election decisions. The Court was critical of
groups that "hid[] behind . . .misleading names like 'The Coalition-
Americans Working for Real Change' (funded by business organizations
opposed to organized labor) . . . [and] 'Republicans for Clean Air'
(funded by brothers Charles and Sam Wyly). ' ' 157 Because these groups
are free to run as many advertisements as they can afford during election
cycles, there is a risk that a small rich minority can have undue influence
on the voting public. In McConnell, the Court held that allowing
individuals and interest groups to mask their true identities impedes
individual citizens' ability to make informed decisions about politics. 1 58
The Court also upheld the provision of the BCRA that required certain
communications authorized by a candidate or his political committee to
clearly identify the candidate or committee.1 59 If the communication
153. Theresa Amato, Participating in Power: A View From the Nader Campaign, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REv. 143, 144 (2002).
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 99 (2003) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S.
377, 397 (2000)).
157. Id. at 197.
158. Id.
159. Id. at230-31.
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was unauthorized, the payor had to be identified and the lack of
authorization disclosed. 160  The Court justified its decision by stating
that the government had an important interest in informing the public
about the problems inherent in the campaign finance system. 161
There is some tension, however, between the McConnell decision and
prior holdings on anonymous speech. In the case of McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Commission,1 62 the petitioner challenged a fine imposed by
the Ohio Elections Commission after she distributed anonymous leaflets
opposing a proposed school tax levy.163 The Court found that "an
author's decision to remain anonymous... is an aspect of [free speech]
protected by the First Amendment."1 64 While the pamphlet discussed in
McIntyre reached fewer people than the televised advertisements
described in McConnell, both cases dealt with political speech-the
category that the First Amendment affords the fullest protection.
The Court has held that anonymous communication has historically
given a voice to groups who would otherwise be silenced. 165 In Talley v.
California,166 the Court noted the importance of anonymous publication
to persecuted groups throughout history who would not otherwise feel
comfortable speaking out against oppression.1 67  The Court has also
found that requiring authors of pamphlets to identify themselves is
unconstitutional because fear of retaliation might have a chilling effect
on public discussion of important issues. 168
The political benefits of permitting anonymous discourse are evident
in a number of areas, most notably printed communications. Leaked
documents, such as the Pentagon Papers, and anonymous tips called in
to reporters have forced some politicians to take responsibility for their
actions while in office. 169 To find that televised advertisements must
honestly reflect their financial backers, the Court must have determined
there was a fundamental difference between the communications
restricted in the BCRA and the other areas where anonymous
communications are permitted.
160. 2 U.S.C. § 441d (2006).
161. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 81 (1976).
162. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
163. Id. at 334.
164. Id. at 342.
165. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
166. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
167. Id.; see NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
168. Talley, 362 U.S. at 65.
169. Cf N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 715 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
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The Court has noted that, in the realm of political speech, a speaker's
identity can mean as much as his message.17 0  For instance, The
Federalist Papers, perhaps the most influential political documents
written in the United States, were published anonymously.7 There is,
however, an important difference between distributing an anonymous
pamphlet and running a national television advertisement whose backers
cloak their identities with misleading names, for instance, the
pharmaceutical industry-funded group that ran advertisements under the
name "Citizens for a Better Medicare. 17 2 Since many voters look to
ideological allies when deciding which candidates to support, an
advertisement that appears to be financed by citizens interested in
improving Medicare could easily mislead a voter who considers Medicare
a top priority.17 3  The BCRA's disclosure requirements help protect
citizens from forming alliances with groups that do not necessarily share
their interests.1 74
The First Amendment implications of McConnell are clear: The
provisions of the BCRA that require special interest groups to disclose
which advertisements they fund goes against the precedent that
anonymous speech receives constitutional protection.1 7 5  The Court,
however, prioritizes citizens' rights to make informed voting decisions
over special interest groups' freedom of speech. By requiring disclosure
only from individuals and interest groups who fund issue advertisements,
the BCRA provides voters with a great deal of information while
limiting the First Amendment implications of its decisions to a
relatively small class of campaign contributors.
IV. CONCLUSION
The research presented in this Article proves that the Court in
McConnell took an important step toward eliminating actual and
apparent corruption in federal campaigns.17 6 The Court's decision was
170. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994) (finding a speaker's identity "is an important
component of many attempts to persuade").
171. The Federalist Papers argued for the ratification of the United States Constitution and comprised
a series of articles written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. They were
published under the pseudonym "Publius," after Roman consul Publius Valerius Publicola. THE
FEDERALIST (Alexander Hamilton, John Jay & James Madison).
172. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 197 (2003).
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 605 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting).
176. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 143.
MCCONNELL V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
far from airtight, however; it relied on a vague definition of corruption
tailored to fit its analysis of different sections of the BCRA.
Nevertheless, having unpacked and weighed the merit of the four
underlying claims in McConnell, it appears that money does indeed have
a corrupting influence on politics and that the pre-BCRA political
fundraising system was in great need of reform. Close analysis of the
campaign finance system suggests that politicians and donors alike were
badly in need of the type of bright line rules established in McConnell,
and the Court's decision to uphold the Act was largely necessary to curb
campaign finance abuses.
A. Money Has a Corrupting Influence on Politics
Before the BCRA, wealthy donors would make large soft money
contributions to campaigns in hopes of gaining access to party officials.
While there is no conclusive evidence that such contributions allowed
donors to influence legislation, the pre-BCRA system of campaign
finance nevertheless gave rise to serious concerns about both actual and
perceived corruption in politics. Thus, the Court was right to uphold the
BCRA's restrictive campaign finance regulations in an effort to
eliminate actual and apparent campaign finance corruption.
B. Limiting the Amount Wealthy Donors Can Give to Candidates Will
Help Curb Corruption, or the Appearance of Corruption, in Politics
While some studies indicate that large donations may not influence
legislation, there is conclusive evidence that such donations create a
sense of beholdenness in elected officials.177  Thus, the BCRA's
restrictions on soft money donations should curb wealthy contributors'
influence over politicians.
While the Act may not entirely eliminate the corruptive effects of
campaign contributions, it will certainly help eliminate the appearance
of corruption in politics, thus fulfilling one of the Court's aims in
McConnell.
The research presented in this Article also indicates that the soft
money limitations imposed by the BCRA will adversely affect pure
ideological donors. These donors wish to represent the strength of their
support to candidates through their contributions, but do not seek special
177. See Bailey, supra note 78, at 16-17; see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 175; Overton, supra note 78,
at 85-86.
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access to elected officials. The BCRA's impact on ideological donors is
unfortunate, but it is a necessary side effect of Congress's effort to
create a more equitable system of campaign finance.
C.The Restrictions on Freedom to Associate Imposed by the BCRA
are Necessary to Prevent Campaign Spending Abuses; However, These
Restrictions May Affect Parties' Abilities to Conduct Generic Campaign
Activities
The BCRA's restrictions on soft money contributions may affect
local and state party committees' abilities to conduct generic campaign
activities, including get-out-the-vote campaigns and voter registration
drives. Evidence presented in this Article, however, shows that these
limits are necessary in order to eliminate campaign finance abuses and
prevent contributors from buying access to elected officials. While the
Court focused its analysis on the BCRA's potential to eliminate
corruption, it remains to be seen if the BCRA's soft money limitations
will negatively impact constituents who previously benefited from voter
registration drives or get-out-the-vote campaigns.
D. The BCRA's Campaign Finance Restrictions May Impose
Disproportionate Burdens on Minor Party Candidates
While candidates from the two major parties will have little trouble
continuing to run successful campaigns under the BCRA, minor parties
may face greater challenges in reaching the public. When Congress
limited soft money donations in the BCRA, it restricted a campaign
fundraising practice that parties had previously relied upon to raise a
significant portion of their campaign funds. Since minor parties already
face great difficulties in disseminating their political platforms, the
BCRA's fundraising restrictions may prove too burdensome to bear.
While the Court has stated that it does not want to artificially support
multiple splinter parties, it does not necessarily follow that these parties
should have to surmount major obstacles in order to disseminate their
views to the voting public.
E. Those Who Purchase Election Advertisements Must Be Truthfully
Identified, So Voters Are Not Misled by the Advertisements'
Messages
Finally, the Article discusses the tension between prior cases
upholding the right to engage in anonymous political speech and the
McConnell decision, which requires purchasers of campaign
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advertisements to reveal their identities. The Court found that, unlike
other forms of political speech, electioneering communications were
often used to trick voters, instead of informing them of issues. The
research presented here indicates that the BCRA's limits are necessary
to help voters make informed decisions.
In sum, this Article sheds light on a campaign finance system in which
money spoke too loudly-a system badly in need of bright line rules to
help politicians and donors alike distinguish right from wrong. The
BCRA and McConnell show an important commitment to creating a
system of campaign finance where the voices of the many are not
drowned out by those of the wealthy few.
